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Abstract 
Land-use change in upper catchments impact downstream water flows. As trees use 
large amounts of water the expansion of upstream plantations can substantially reduce 
water availability to downstream users. There can also be impacts on downstream 
salinity due to reduced dilution flows. In some jurisdictions afforestation requires the 
purchase of water rights from downstream holders, while in others it does not, 
effectively handing the water rights to the upstream landholders. We consider the 
economic efficiency and equity (profitability and distributional) consequences of 
upstream land use change in the presence of a water market under alternate property 
rights regimes and different salinity scenarios. 
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Shortfalls in water supplies are perhaps the greatest practical NRM policy concern in 
Australia today, looming larger in many minds than the great international debates 
(Gore, 2006; Lomborg, 2007) on greenhouse gases, climate change and biodiversity.  
Because forestry uses more water per hectare than any other (Zhang et al. 2007; 
Gilfedder et al, 2009), expansion of upstream tree plantations can reduce water yields 
on which downstream urban, agricultural and wetlands depend.   
 
Nordblom et al. (2009) consider the distributions of water use among various 
upstream and downstream landholders and water users within a catchment. The study 
considers the impact that land use decisions in the upper catchment have on 
downstream water users. If the demand for water among upstream users increases, for 
instance as greenhouse gas markets lead to an increase in the value of forestry, more 
water will be used upstream, and less water will be delivered to downstream water 
users. The analysis considers the potential for upstream and downstream water users 
to trade water entitlements. Such a market can ensure that water is allocated to its 
highest value use. A South Australian example deals with such an issue (DWLBC 
2005; Schonfeldt 2005). Further benefits may be obtained by distinguishing between 
salty and fresh sub-catchments, enabling salt-sensitive water users to act via the 
market to secure reduced salinity in downstream flows. 
 
Nordblom et al. (2009) showed that, by defining property rights both upstream and 
downstream, and facilitating trade between them may improve the welfare of both 
communities. There are strong theoretical grounds for advocating such a policy. 
While sound theory is necessary for economic policy, it is not always sufficient.  
Human behaviour often deviates from theoretical assumptions of rational, self-
interested actions (Smith 1994; Kahneman 2002). This means the impact of a market 
or other policy intervention may be less than anticipated, and in some cases there may 
be unintended consequences (Whitten et al. 2004). Environmental policy therefore has 
much to gain from considering real human behaviour rather than stylised economic 
agents (Gintis 2000).  
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Experimental economics provides a method for incorporating human behaviour into 
policy design (see Smith 1994, 2002). Experimental participants are engaged in a 
simulated economic scenario and their decisions observed. To make the scenario 
incentive-compatible, participants are paid based on the outcomes of their decisions. 
Experiments can be used to test economic hypotheses and compare alternative 
economic institutions under controlled laboratory conditions. 
 
This paper describes an experimental economics simulation of an upstream-
downstream water market described in Nordblom et al. (2009). Our objective was to 
demonstrate how a market linking upstream and downstream water users adjusts from 
different initial water entitlements toward theoretical equilibrium holdings of 
entitlements, and to test how readily the theoretical equilibria would be reached. We 
also experimentally tested the effect of incorporating a very salty sub-catchment 
upstream from a salt-sensitive downstream user in the market. A key issue in the 
implementation of a market linking upstream and downstream water users is the 
initial allocation of property rights. For example, should upstream landholders, where 
most of the rain falls, have entitlement to the water? Alternately should they buy 
water from downstream users if they wish to use more, for example by expanding 
forestry? 
 
While initial allocations of property rights clearly have massive financial implications 
for those concerned, it need not necessarily affect the subsequent functioning of the 
market. The Coase theorem states that, in the absence of transaction costs, markets 
will efficiently allocate resources regardless of their initial distribution (Coase 1960). 
However, this prediction may not hold with human traders, who do not always 
conform to ‘rational’ behaviour. In fact people often place a higher value on things 
they have than on things they do not – this is termed the ‘endowment effect’ (Thaler 
1980). This is supported by experiments showing that people who are endowed with 
an item tend to be considerably less willing to sell it than others are to buy it, resulting 
in far less trade than anticipated (Knetsch and Sinden 1984; Kahneman et al. 1990).  
 
The endowment effect means that the initial allocation of property rights may not only 
have equity implications, but could also impact on the subsequent functioning of the 
market. The same applies to any regulatory intervention which redistributes rights and Experiments with markets linking upstream plantations with downstream water users 
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entitlements. We explore this in our experiments by comparing two alternative 
property right allocations (downstream only; both upstream and downstream). 
According to Coase, the market should reach the same equilibrium in either case, but 
according to the endowment effect it may not. We also examine how the market 
responds to a sudden reversal of property rights. With perfectly rational economic 
agents the market equilibrium should be unaffected (though the distribution of profits 
will be altered), but human traders may respond differently.   
 
Methods 
Our experimental scenario included upstream and downstream water use sectors, 
based on data and modelling described in Nordblom et al. (2009). We took a $70/m
3 
stumpage value for tree products, the top end of the range considered in the model. At 
this price, six sectors would be active in an extended water market. Two of these 
(UC10 and UC8, see Figure 1) are upper-catchment areas with 1000 and 800 mm 
annual rainfall, respectively; two (MCU and MCUS) are mid-catchment areas with 
700 and 600 mm rainfalls, the latter being the saltiest sub-catchment; two downstream 
sectors (IRR and S&D) are the irrigation and the stock & domestic water users.  
 
An additional sector UHS (urban and other high security) water users is assumed to 
require high quality water rather than additional water.  This is an issue only in the 
hypothetical case that one of the sub-catchments (MCUS) yields very salty water, 
with 20 times the salt concentration of the actual area.  This potentially becomes 
important if there are large reductions in dilution flows from the upper catchment that 
are due to new tree plantations.  In this case UHS might subsidise tree planting in 
MCUS (toping up the marginal values of water use by trees in MCUS), rather than 
being directly represented in the experiment.  
 
The lower-rainfall sectors (UC6 and MCD in Figure 1) were excluded from the 
experiment as high water prices precluded tree planting and consequently their 
engagement in a market if water rights had to be purchased. We excluded the 
Wetlands sector (WL) and effluent creeks and rivers (ECR) from the experiments and 
assumed the water use entitlements they hold will be respected by the six sectors 
named above.  This assumption is not based on historical observation but is justified Experiments with markets linking upstream plantations with downstream water users 
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here as we seek to understand a possible means to sustain river flows by regulation 
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Figure 1.  Schematic map of the Macquarie Catchment identifying key water sources 
by rainfall zone, salinity and location with respect to key sectors (from 
Nordblom et al. 2009). 
 
A practical matter for our experiments was that the larger sectors would need to make 
a large number of trades to reach equilibrium and consequently time might become 
limiting. Our solution was to divide the largest sectors (UC8 and IRR) into two half-
sectors.  The horizontal sum of the water demand schedules of the half-sectors UC8a Experiments with markets linking upstream plantations with downstream water users 
 
6
and UC8b equals the original demand schedule of UC8.  The half-sectors IRRa and 
IRRb, similarly, add up to the original IRR sector’s demand schedule. 
 
Experiments were carried out with specially-developed software that features a real-
time market interface. There were eight participants, each taking on the role of an 
upstream or downstream sector in the market. Table 1 lists the roles represented in the 
experiment. There were three downstream users – two representing irrigators and one 
for other users. The other five participants represented upstream sub-catchments.  
Experiments were context-free, as is usual practice in experimental economics. At the 
start of each trading period participants were allocated a number of units (see ‘Initial 
units held’ in Table 1).  The human subjects did not deal with water or salt in our 
experiments, but simpler trading ‘units’.  Participants earned money relative to the 
units they held at the end of each trading period. The values of these units, which 
were derived from the marginal values of water for each sector (Appendix A and B), 
were displayed in a table on each person’s screen. No participant could see any 
other’s marginal values, but only the prices of offers to sell units and bids to buy 
units, which were posted for all to see.  
 
During the trading period participants could trade units with one another via a 
continuous double auction. Participants could increase their earnings by selling units 
in the market for more than their marginal value, or buying additional units for less 
than their marginal value. Bids and offers in the market could be seen by all 
participants, along with the last traded price. All trades were for single units. Each 
trading period lasted for five minutes, after which participants received an update of 
their total earning for that period. Units were reallocated at the start of the following 
period – units could not be carried over from one period to the next. 
 
There were two variables in the experiment, the presence or absence of a very salty 
sub-catchment (following Nordblom et al. 2009) and the initial allocation of property 
rights. The absence or presence of very salty flows (FRESH/SALTY) from MCUS 
was reflected in different marginal values for water by that sub-catchment 
(Appendices A and B), as the downstream salt-sensitive user (UHS) was assumed to 
‘top-up’ the benefits of a SALTY MCUS by $200/unit (A$2m/GL) used if for 
planting trees. Property rights were initially allocated either completely downstream Experiments with markets linking upstream plantations with downstream water users 
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(D) or mostly to upstream users (U) in Table 1. These allocations were reversed 
midway through the experiment to test the impact of changing property rights. (see 
illustrations in Figures 2 and 3). Participants had no prior warning of this, other than 
being told in the initial instructions that ‘allocations may change during the 
experiment’. Combining these two variables gave four treatments in total (Table 1). 
 
Table 1.   Experimental design and theoretical eqililbrium outcomes  
 
Treatment  Salinity scenario  Order of Initial Endowments 
T1-SUD  SALTY  U then D 
T2-FUD  FRESH  U then D 
T3-FDU  FRESH  D then U 
T4-SDU  SALTY  D then U 
    
Participant: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 Sum 
Sector: UC10 UC8a UC8b  MCU MCUS IRRa S&D IRRb units 
Initial units held  
D  0 0  0  0  0 65  27  65  157 
U  34 38  38  20  7  2 16 2  157 




54 16  16  3  0  24  19 25  157 
SALTY  
($192) 
52 14  14  2  15  21  18 21  157 
  
A Theoretical equilibrium prices and units held were derived from Nordblom et al. (2009), 
Tables 7 & 8. Participants were not made aware of these theoretical expectations. 
 
The experiments were carried out at the University of Sydney and Charles Sturt 
University in Orange, NSW. Prior to each experimental session participants read a set 
of instructions (Appendices C and D). They then had a practice trading period, which 
familiarised them with the interface. This practice period used a different set of 
marginal value tables to the subsequent experiment. Experiments ran for ten 5-minute 
trading periods (not including the practice periods). At the end of the experiment 
participants were paid in cash, based on their individual experimental ‘earnings’ over 
all ten periods. Average payments to individuals were A$33. All decisions made in 
the experiment were anonymous, with participants identified by ID numbers and 
interacting only via computer. There was no talking and no use of mobile phones. Experiments with markets linking upstream plantations with downstream water users 
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represent:     UC10      ½ UC8      ½ UC8    MCU     MCUS                     ½ IRR        S&D        ½ IRR
upstream             downstream  
Figure 2.   A market defined by marginal values of all participants, with initial 
endowments of units only in the hands of downstream users (D); not in equilibrium 
here 
 
























represent:     UC10      ½ UC8      ½ UC8    MCU     MCUS                     ½ IRR        S&D        ½ IRR
upstream             downstream  
Figure 3.   An imaginary market defined by marginal values of all participants and 
initial endowments of units in the hands of upstream as well as downstream users (U); 




Examples of experimental results from two trading periods, one starting with water 
rights scenario U and one starting with D, are given in the Figures 4 and 5, 
respectively. These were chosen for display because they were among those coming 
closest to the theoretically expected prices and final ‘units held’. Summaries of all  
replicates of the experiment are given in the tables that follow.   
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Notice, in Fig. 4a and Fig. 5a the range of trade prices shown is between $130 and 
$270/unit as this nicely brackets the expected equilibrium price derived by Nordblom 
et al. (2009) shown in Table 1. However, a small number of the recorded trade prices 
were far outside this window, with one being $1/unit and one being $1750, both being 
well outside the ranges of marginal values with which the participants were working. 
We took the step of excluding any trades with prices greater than three digits or less 



















































Scenario U starts with upstream as
well as downstream endowments
6 $250.00 $190.00 $150.00 $199.00 $185.00 6 $189.10 $184.90 $179.60 $
7 $220.00 $190.00 $151.00 $199.00 $190.00 7 $200.00 $176.00 $179.60 $
8 $180.00 $195.00 $160.00 $181.00 $185.00 8 $176.50 $181.00 $179.60 $
9 $180.00 $190.00 $161.00 $199.00 $190.00 9 $180.00 $176.00 $175.00 $
10 $135.00 $200.00 $187.00 $184.00 $190.00 10 $200.00 $176.00 $175.00 $
11 $200.00 $190.00 $160.00 $199.00 $185.00 11 $200.00 $181.00 $174.00 $
12 $200.00 $190.00 $199.00 $199.00 $193.00 12 $180.00 $181.00 $174.00 $
13 $200.00 $190.00 $161.00 $199.00 $190.00 13 $200.00 $181.00 $175.00 $
14 $199.00 $190.00 $195.00 $165.00 $190.00 14 $189.10 $181.00 $180.00 $
15 $199.00 $190.00 $181.00 $170.00 $186.00 15 $180.00 $180.00 $179.00 $
16 $200.00 $190.00 $195.00 $166.00 $186.00 16 $159.00 $181.00 $175.00 $
17 $199.00 $190.00 $166.00 $171.00 $199.00 17 $155.00 $179.00 $179.00 $
18 $199.00 $200.00 $166.00 $199.00 $186.00 18 $159.00 $180.00 $174.00 $
19 $199.00 $190.00 $166.00 $199.00 $187.00 19 $180.00 $179.00 $179.00 $
20 $195.00 $190.00 $168.00 $199.00 $190.00 20 $159.00 $176.00 $174.00 $
21 $199.00 $190.00 $199.00 $200.00 $199.00 21 $159.00 $179.00 $179.00 $
22 $199.00 $190.00 $199.00 $180.00 $191.00 22 $150.00 $170.00 $174.00 $
23 $195.00 $190.00 $199.00 $199.00 $191.00 23 $159.00 $179.00 $173.00 $
24 $200.00 $190.00 $199.00 $180.00 $188.00 24 $200.00 $179.00 $179.00 $
25 $199.00 $250.00 $199.00 $180.00 $188.00 25 $150.00 $180.00 $173.00 $
26 $199.00 $190.00 $200.00 $199.00 $193.00 26 $159.00 $178.00 $174.00 $
27 $199.00 $195.00 $199.00 $180.00 $188.00 27 $150.00 $177.00 $173.00 $
28 $199.00 $151.00 $199.00 $190.00 $180.00 28 $149.00 $176.00 $160.00 $
29 $199.00 $190.00 $199.00 $191.00 $188.00 29 $149.00 $188.00 $180.00 $
30 $199.00 $150.00 $199.00 $191.00 $190.00 30 $149.00 $181.00 $160.00 $
31 $199.00 $151.00 $199.00 $193.00 $190.00 31 $149.00 $176.00 $160.00 $
32 $150.00 $151.00 $180.00 $180.00 $191.00 32 $159.00 $175.00 $179.00 $
33 $180.00 $195.00 $180.50 $192.00 $193.00 33 $158.00 $176.00 $160.00 $
34 $190.00 $150.00 $180.50 $183.00 $190.00 34 $200.00 $174.00 $159.00 $
35 $151.00 $150.00 $175.00 $193.00 $190.00 35 $200.00 $173.00 $160.00 $
36 $190.00 $151.00 $180.00 $184.00 $180.00 36 $199.00 $171.00 $177.00 $
37 $190.00 $180.00 $175.50 $183.00 $191.00 37 $200.00 $171.00 $160.00 $
38 $190.00 $160.00 $180.50 $191.00 $193.00 38 $199.00 $172.00 $170.00 $
39 $190.00 $181.00 $180.50 $191.00 $190.00 39 $200.00 $171.00 $200.00 $



































Figure 4.     Prices of trades (a) made by participants in five 5-minute periods under 
scenario U where initial endowments are spread among upstream as well as 
downstream parties, and (b) running accounts of ‘Units Held’  in the final period (5) 
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Figure 5.    Prices of trades (a) made by participants in five 5-minute periods under 
scenario D where initial endowments are all in the hands of downstream parties, and 
(b) running accounts of ‘Units Held’  in the final period (10) 
 
It is apparent in Fig. 5 above that three participants (UC10, IRRa and IRRb) had the 
most trading to do before being satisfied they could not do more.   
 
In the tables below, the initial U and D ‘Units Held’ are indicated in the headings of 
each section and the ‘Expected Final’ holdings are indicated at the bottom, as given in 
Table 1 above. The observed final holdings of each sector (participant) are shown 
with the mean and standard deviation of prices of the final 20 trades. The aggregate 
units of water held by the upstream sectors (1–5) and downstream sectors (6–8) are 
also shown because these may be used in comparing the results of the U and D cases.  
 
In both FRESH and SALTY treatments (Tables 2 – 4) the mean total upstream units 
held are greater than expected under scenario U and less than expected under scenario 
D.  Whichever group holds the units at the beginning of the experiment tends to hold 
more than ‘expected’ at the experiment’s end. 
 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effects of trade on income 
 
The laboratory experiments support the theory that a market can facilitate the efficient 
allocation of water between upstream and downstream users, resulting in higher 
overall incomes than without trade. Overall wealth among all sectors of the catchment 
in the absence of any market is compared with that given all potentially profitable 
trades in a market (Figure 6).  Income levels observed during the experiments are 














































Figure 6.  Total income across all sectors, with and without a market linking 
upstream and downstream users (over all ten periods, considering only the 
Fresh treatment, with initial distributions U and D combined).  
 
In Figure 6 and the following charts, ‘market observed’ are the experimental results. 
‘Market in theory’ values are those of the calculated optimal market distribution of 
water use from the viewpoint of maximising catchment NPV (Nordblom et al. 2009). 
‘No market’ represents the outcome under the initial endowments of water rights, 
with no subsequent trade taking place. 
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It is clear that even with traders who had no prior experience in the market before 
coming to the experiments, most of the potential gains from trade were realised. The 
average price for trades in the fresh treatment was $185.13, a little below the 
theoretical equilibrium value of $188. (This suggests that the price was converging 
from below. Buyers have more market power in this scenario). 
 
Considering salt values in addition to water increases the overall value of the system, 
both with and without trade (Figure 7). In the experimental sessions the market 
improved overall income, although it remained some way short of the theoretical 











































Figure 7.  Overall, the observed market was able to capture most but not all the 
benefits of trade. Higher overall incomes in the case where a very salty sub-catchment 
(MCUS) exists are due to an external subsidy for tree planting there to mitigate river 
salinity. 
 
Incorporating salt values particularly increased the value of the SALTY mid-
catchment area (MCUS), but not because salinity is beneficial. Rather, in high 
concentrations, it is damaging to downstream urban water users (UHS). The benefit to 
MCUS is an artefact of our assumption that UHS would provide an external subsidy 
of $2m/GL to landowners using this water (and holding back salt from the river) Experiments with markets linking upstream plantations with downstream water users 
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through establishing new tree plantations in that sub-catchment, paid by UHS to 
reduce river salinity. The average experimental trade price was $187.46. This is 
higher than in the fresh treatments, reflecting the increased value of salt mitigation, 
but still below the theoretical equilibrium of $192. 
 
Overall income was higher where property rights were initially allocated upstream. In 
this treatment reversing the distribution of initial water rights after period five made 
little impact on overall welfare (Figure 8), although it will, of course, have had 
massive distributional impacts among the various participants. The reduction in 
overall income in the downstream-only treatment was only partially offset when 








































U            D D            U
Order of presentation of initial endowments in experiment  
Figure 8. Effects of presentation order of initial endowments (UD or DU) on overall 
income observed in experiments (means +/- standard errors). With U, regardless of 
order, observed overall catchment income was only slightly greater than with D; the 
difference was greatest (approx. 2.7%) where the order was DU. See Table 1 for 
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Effects of trade on the distribution of final units held 
 
Experimentally observed performance was variable among the sector incomes and 
final numbers of units held (Figures 9 and 10). Over the six replicates of the SALTY 
treatment, for example, UC10 on average performed worse than in the absence of a 
market. This is a result of “irrational” trades made by individuals representing UC10 
in two of the SALTY replicates. In contrast the irrigation sector did better than 
predicted by theory – these participants may have been exploiting market power to 
pay below the equilibrium price for water, and with the others, benefited from 
‘irrational’ trades made by UC10. 
 
Considering individual sectors, all are in theory made better off by the introduction of 
the market, provided initial rights allocations are not changed. Figure 9 shows very 
large differences in observed incomes among sectors with the two scenarios of initial 
endowments of units held. In scenario U, which assumes large upstream endowments, 
all upstream sectors (except UC10) retain more units than theoretically expected 
given the opportunity to profitably sell units to the downstream IRR sector. In 
scenario D, where all units are initially held by the downstream S&D and IRR sectors, 
they retain more units than theoretically expected. The market has theoretical benefits 
for all sectors (although for the S&D sector it is very small). Most of these benefits 
were realised in the experiments. In the experimental sessions the actual distributions 
of gains from trade varied with individual trading performance.  
 
In the FRESH case with U initial endowments (Figure 9), MCUS shows income only 
from the sale of its endowments since it cannot gain as much from using the units. In 
the SALTY case, MCUS is able to gain from using its endowments with U or 











































































Figure 9.   Observed incomes of different sectors are strongly affected by the 
distributions of initial endowments (D and U) in both the FRESH and SALTY cases.  
Where the downstream sectors (S&D and IRR) hold all initial endowments (D), they 
are able to gain considerably by selling to the upstream sectors who have high 
incentives to buy units. When endowments are mainly in the hands of the upstream 
sectors, they gain income from using the units and selling to the downstream users.   
 
Examining average unit holdings at the end of each period(Figure 10) shows that 
these differ from the theoretically expected equilibrium holdings listed in Table 1.  




























Figure 10. Expected and observed unit holdings at the end of the trading period, over 
             the first five periods of the experimental sessions (means +/- standard errors),  









These experiments demonstrate how the introduction of a market linking upstream 
and downstream water users can more efficiently allocate water and hence increase 
overall welfare. Experimental participants were able to secure most of the potential 
gains from trade in this system. However, while trading in these experiments is free of 
risk, financial constraints and transaction costs, observed performance still fell short 
of the theoretical equilibrium. In the real-world, with all these obstacles present and 
with many more players in the market, we may be assured that a lower share of the 
potential gains from trade will be captured. 
 
It is also clear that with human subjects there is greater variability in outcomes. Not 
all participants will be equally adept at realising potential gains from trade offered 
through a market-based policy intervention. While in theory no one should be worse 
off with access to a market, even in our simple experimental scenario some 
participants managed to ‘lose’ money overall. 
 
Our results also suggest that the initial endowments of property rights can have a 
significant impact on market performance, contrary to the Coase theorem. In the real 
world, with transaction costs and barriers to entering the market (such as knowledge 
and experience of the trading process), endowment effects may be greater still. Our 
results also show that sudden shifts in property rights, as occurred midway through 
the experimental sessions, can impact the functioning of the market, with participants 
less willing than expected to purchase what they had previously owned. 
 
To be fair, some of the discrepancies observed in the experimental sessions may be an 
artefact of the limited time available for trading. All trades were for single units, so 
participants may have run out of time (even though the five minute trading periods in 
theory allowed more than enough time for all profitable trades to take place). 
Experimental participants often appeared to be more concerned about ‘getting a good 
price’ for individual trades than in maximising their overall income. They focus on 
price at the expense of volume, resulting in sub-optimal trading performance. This is 
also observed in real-world markets, in which people will walk away from profitable 
trades if they feel they are not getting the best possible price (e.g. Ariely 2008). 
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These effects may have been exacerbated by the structure of our experiment, in which 
there were three downstream participants and five upstream. The downstream 
participants may have been able to exert market power, withholding supply (or 
demand) in order to get more favourable prices. This would be less likely in the real 




Without the regulation that water entitlements be purchased to offset the extra water 
use by tree plantations the implications are clear. Where profitability of tree 
plantations increase (due to markets for wood products and/or carbon sequestration, 
possibly combined with other incentives), we should expect expansion of tree 
enterprises and subsequent reductions in river flows (see Nordblom et al. 2009).  
 
These negative consequences of expanded tree plantations may be avoided by 
introduction of policy and regulations that water entitlements be purchased to offset 
the extra water use by non-holders of entitlements. As in South Australia the amount 
of offset water required for a given area of plantation is a function of the rainfall zone 
and other factors that affect the expected reduction in water yield (DWLBC 2005). 
The result is not a prohibition on new plantations but a balance in water use; where 
entitlements for water to be used by the trees are purchased from those downstream 
entitlement holders who are willing to permanently give up their entitlements. 
 
However, policy makers need to consider that not all expected gains from trade will 
be realised, and some individuals may make costly mistakes in a market. This is 
particularly important where new markets are introduced and participants don’t have 
experience of similar markets. If landholders are to be engaged in trading new forms 
of water or salinity rights, some form of training program may prove beneficial, both 
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Appendix A.   Sector-by-sector marginal values of units used in experiments  
5 (MCUS) 5 (MCUS)
Unit Held 1 (UC10) 2 (UC8a) 3 (UC8b) 4 (MCU) 5 FRESH 5 SALTY 6 (IRRb) 7 (S&D)  8 (IRRa)
0
1 273 235 237 206 165 369 223 328 222
2 268 230 233 198 138 342 222 320 221
3 263 226 228 189 118 322 220 312 219
4 258 222 224 182 105 309 218 304 218
5 254 218 220 176 96 300 217 296 216
6 250 214 216 170 91 295 215 288 214
7 246 211 213 165 88 292 214 280 213
8 243 208 209 160 86 290 212 272 211
9 240 205 206 156 84 288 210 264 210
10 236 202 203 153 80 284 209 256 208
11 234 199 200 150 74 278 207 248 206
12 231 196 198 147 63 267 206 240 205
13 229 194 195 145 47 251 204 232 203
14 226 192 193 144 25 229 202 224 202
15 224 190 191 142 0 199 201 216 200
16 222 188 189 141 0 159 199 208 198
17 221 186 187 140 0 110 198 200 197
18 219 184 185 139 196 192 195
19 218 183 184 138 194 184 194
20 216 181 182 138 193 176 192
21 215 180 181 137 191 168 190
22 214 179 179 137 190 160 189
23 213 178 178 136 188 152 187
24 212 177 177 135 186 144 186
25 212 176 176 134 185 136 184
26 211 175 175 133 183 128 182
27 210 174 175 131 182 120 181
28 210 174 174 130 180 112 179
29 209 173 173 128 178 104 178
30 209 172 173 125 177 96 176
31 209 172 172 122 175 88 174
32 208 171 172 119 174 80 173
33 208 171 171 115 172 72 171
34 207 171 171 111 170 64 170
35 207 170 170 106 169 56 168
36 207 170 170 100 167 48 166
37 206 170 170 94 166 40 165
38 206 169 169 87 164 163
39 205 169 169 79 162 162
40 205 169 169 70 161 160
41 204 168 168 60 159 158
42 204 168 168 49 158 157
43 203 168 168 38 156 155
44 202 167 167 25 154 154
45 201 167 167 12 153 152
46 200 166 167 151 150
47 199 166 166 150 149
48 198 165 166 148 147
49 197 165 165 146 146
50 195 164 164 145 144
51 194 163 164 143 142
52 192 162 163 142 141
53 190 161 162 140 139
54 188 160 161 138 138
55 186 159 160 137 136
56 183 158 159 135 134
57 181 157 157 134 133
58 178 155 156 132 131
59 175 154 155 130 130
60 171 152 153 129 128
61 168 150 151 127 126
62 164 148 149 126 125
63 160 146 147 124 123
64 155 144 145 122 122
65 151 142 143 121 120
66 146 139 140 119 118
67 141 136 138 118 117
68 135 133 135 116 115
69 129 130 132 114 114
70 123 127 129 113 112
71 117 123 125
72 110 120 122
73 103 116 118
74 95 112 114
75 88 107 110
76 79 103 105
77 71 98 101
78 62 93 96
79 52 88 90
80 42 82 85
81 32 77 79
82 22 70 74












Appendix B.  Plots of marginal values facing participants in experiments.  These are 
values given in Appendix A. 
 










































 Note: Correspondence with values in Nordblom et al. (2009) is simple: 
   1 unit here = entitlement to 1 GL of water /year there, and $1 here = $0.01m there,   
   the numeraire for permanent water trades and expected NPV. In Table 8 there,  
   89 GL was the most water sold by IRR, starting from an initial level of 333 GL. To  
   allow greater scope for change in the experiments it was assumed that IRR could  
   choose to sell up to 130 GL.  Splitting IRR into IRRa and IRRb sectors meant each  
could trade away up to 65 GL from the initial levels, where zero for IRR in the  
   experiment corresponds to 333 GL in the ‘real world’ depicted there.  Working ‘up’ 
   the marginal value curves, giving up ‘units held’, effectively provided the supply 
curves of IRRa and IRRb in the case of D initial endowments. Likewise for S&D.  
In the cases of U initial endowments, IRRa and IRRb each are assumed to start with 












APPENDIX D.      Participants’ instructions  (next four pages) Experimental Scenario
• In this experiment you have the 
opportunity to trade experimental “units”
• Each unit has a value to you




• The experiment consists of a number of 
rounds
• Each round lasts for five minutes
• You will earn money, based on the value 
of the units you hold at the end of each 
round, and your trading activity
2
Units 
• At the beginning of each round you will be 
assigned a number of units
• During each round you may buy and sell 
units in the market 
• Units are ‘cashed in’ at the end of each 
round  - the value of each unit you hold will 
be added to your bank balance
• The unit value table shows how much 
each unit is worth to you
3
At the start of the experiment you will see a screen like this:











Marginal Value Num. Units Held • The table shows the marginal 
value for each unit
• For example, here unit number 
nine is worth $16 to you; unit 
number ten is worth $15
• Therefore if you currently have 
nine units, the value of an 
additional unit is $15
• The greyed out row in the middle 
of the table shows the number of 
units you currently hold
• As you buy and sell units the 
values in the table will adjust to 












Marginal Value Num. Units Held • It is important that you 
understand the values in the table 
in order to trade effectively
• Remember the table shows the 
marginal value for each unit
• In this example, each unit has a 
different value
• If you hold nine units and you 
buy an additional unit, that unit is 
worth $15 at the end of the round
• If you hold nine units and sell 
one unit, that unit would have 












Marginal Value Num. Units Held













Marginal Value Num. Units Held
If you sell a unit the 
table will scroll up
8
Trading Hints
• When thinking about buying or selling 
units, make sure you consider your current 
marginal values
• You don’t want to buy a unit for more than 
it is worth to you
• Nor would you want to sell one for less 
than it is worth
9
How to Trade
• Units can be bought or sold one at a time
• You can buy and sell as many units as you 
like each round, time permitting
1
0
At the start of the experiment you will see a screen like this:
11
How to Buy
• First, decide how much you are willing to 
pay for an additional unit
• You can then make a ‘bid to buy’ – enter 
your price in the ‘bid to buy’ box
OR
• You can accept an ‘offer to sell’ made by 
another participant 
12To make a bid to buy, 
enter your price here
and click here
Your bid will appear 
in the market here
How to Buy
13
Offers to sell already in 
the market appear here





To make an offer to sell, 
enter your price here
and click here
Your offer will appear 
in the market here 15
How to Sell
To accept a bid, click here Bids to buy already in 
the market appear here
16
Bids in the market flash green when 
you accept them, or red when 
someone else does
When you make a trade, 
your profit appears here in 
green (or your loss in red!)
17
After you make a trade, your 
‘number of units held’ and unit 
value table are updated
18The ‘clock’ ticks down to the 
end of each round The most recent price at which 
anyone traded appears here
19
Please ignore the ‘Bank Units’ feature 
(it is for a different experiment) Your ‘experimental bank balance’
updates throughout the experiment 
20
At the end of each round you see a summary of your results. At the start of the 
next round you will be given a fresh allocation of units. The only thing carried 
forward is your bank balance!
21
Bids and Offers
• Bids and offers expire after two minutes
• You can only have one bid and one offer 
in the market at a time
• Submitting a new bid or offer automatically 
replaces any existing bid or offer
• Keep an eye on your value table – this will 
change as your unit holdings change
22
Be Aware…
• There are a limited number of units 
available
• Initially they are allocated to certain 
participants




• There will be a 15 minute practice period, 
which doesn’t count towards your earnings 
• All decisions made during the experiment 
are confidential
• Please don’t talk or look at others’ screens 
during the experiment 
• You will be paid in cash based on your 
bank balance at the end of the experiment
• Any questions at any time, please ask…
24